The appeals process --whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority --is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking procedures). It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would thus make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals.
Introduction
This article develops the point that the ability of litigants to appeal decisions of adjudicators to a higher authority may lead to the making of better decisions because the appeals process constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. The appeals process is a feature of virtually all formal legal systems, of many private dispute resolution arrangements (such as those of trade associations and religious organizations), and also of certain decisionmaking procedures within firms, so its relevance is broad.
1 Indeed, whenever a person might be affected by a deviant action of an agent and would be led to report it credibly to the principal, one might consider an appeals process of a sort to be at work. The appeals process can thus be conceived as a general way to mold the behavior of an agent to a principal's benefit. In section 2, I study a basic model in which there is a socially correct decision, an adjudicator may obtain a benefit from choosing a different decision, and each of two opposing litigants has the right to appeal a decision to an appeals court, at a cost.
Because the adjudicator can anticipate that a decision would be appealed if its deviation is large enough to outweigh the cost of an appeal to a litigant, the adjudicator will be led to keep his deviations below the point at which appeals would be provoked. Thus, the appeals process induces decisions to conform to socially desirable decisions, at least within the range governed by the cost of an appeal. Furthermore, the appeals process yields this benefit without absorbing resources, as the appeals process does not actually result in appeals (although, as will be discussed, appeals do occur in an extension of the basic model where adjudicators are uncertain whether appeals will be made 3 ). Hence, when the appeals process results in changes in adjudicator behavior, it raises social welfare.
To better appreciate the virtue of the appeals process, it is compared in section 3 to a natural alternative, namely, random monitoring of adjudicators' decisions. Random monitoring of decisions can also induce adjudicators to conform their decisions to socially desirable decisions. But for monitoring to be effective, a positive degree of monitoring must actually occur. Thus, unlike the appeals process, random monitoring absorbs resources. The cost advantage of the appeals process over random monitoring (which may well exist even when the appeals process does result in appeals, due to uncertainty) reflects what may be regarded as a distinctive feature of the appeals process:
3 Another reason that the appeals process may absorb resources is that society may need to invest some amount in appeals courts in order that the threat of appeal be credible to adjudicators.
that it harnesses the information that litigants possess about decisions and thus leads to review of decisions only if they deviate from socially desirable decisions.
In section 4, a series of extensions of the basic model is considered. The first concerns subsidy of the appeals process. Here it is explained that a subsidy is beneficial (and that the optimal subsidy is complete) since, on one hand, it increases the threat of appeal and thus makes adjudicator decisions better reflect socially desirable ones, and, on the other hand, a subsidy does not lead to greater social costs since appeals do not actually occur.
The second extension relates to contexts in which only a single litigant can make an appeal (such as individuals contesting benefit awards by the Social Security Administration). Here the effectiveness of the appeals process is reduced relative to what it is when there are opposing litigants, since any decision that is favorable to the single litigant will not be appealed; the appeals process functions only to discipline unfavorable decisions to the litigant.
The third extension addresses the possibility that a litigant who would want to make an appeal could instead settle with the opposing litigant, in order to save the joint costs of an appeal. Although a litigant who could bring an appeal would have a motive to settle, the adjudicator would still want to avoid decisions that would provoke appeal, for the adjudicator would not want the accompanying settlement to occur. Therefore, the adjudicator's decision turns out to be the same as when settlement of appeals is not considered as a possibility.
The fourth extension allows for multiple levels of appeal. It is shown that decisions at each level are implicitly guided by the preferences of all higher levels, including the topmost, say the n th , level of appeal, because decisions at the n -1 st level of appeal will reflect judicial preferences at the n th level, decisions at the n -2 nd level of appeal will reflect decisions that would be made at the n -1 st level, and so on. In this way, judicial preferences at the highest level of appeal are translated all the way down to the adjudicator at the trial court level. However, the transmission of judicial preferences is not perfect; in particular, trial court decisions may differ from those preferred by the highest appeals court by as much as the sum of the costs of appeal across the different levels of appeal.
The fifth extension concerns uncertainty about the outcome of an appeal. When
parties are uncertain what the socially desirable decision that would be found by the appeals court would be, the appeals process leads adjudicators to conform their decisions to the expected appeals court decision rather than to the actual, socially preferred decision. This renders the appeals process less valuable than when appeals court decisions are accurately foreseen and may make the appeals process socially undesirable.
A corollary to this point, with a very different interpretation, is also noted. Suppose that uncertain appeals courts decisions are not presumed to be socially desirable (whereas they are assumed so immediately above) but that they are socially desirable on average.
Then adjudicators who are uncertain about appeals court decisions will make decisions as if appeals courts always make the social desirable decision.
The sixth extension involves uncertainty about whether an appeal will be made.
When adjudicators are uncertain whether litigants will make an appeal, adjudicator decisions will sometimes not forestall appeals, and appeals will in fact occur. This means, among other things, that the appeals process becomes socially costly, and may not be socially worthwhile.
The last extension examines the possibility of granting discretion to appeals courts to decide whether or not to hear cases that have been appealed. Giving appeals courts such discretion offers a potential social cost-saving advantage: a litigant may wish to make an appeal even though the social cost of an appeal outweighs the social benefit, so that refusal by the appeals court to consider an appeal may be socially beneficial. Yet discretion is not necessarily socially desirable, because it reduces the threat of appeal to the adjudicator, and hence his motive to make his decisions resemble those of the appeals court.
The point of this article, that the appeals process influences the decisions of adjudicators because they want to avoid appeal, is a common theme in a general qualitative sense in legal literature, 4 but has not been much developed to my knowledge in economically-oriented literature. However, particular aspects of the effect of the appeals process on adjudicator behavior have been examined by economists: Levy (2003) focuses on the tendency of judges to provoke appeal, so as to signal that they are talented and to benefit from an enhanced reputation; and Iossa and Palumbo (2004) emphasize the role of the appeals process in a comparison of the adversarial and inquisitorial methods of acquisition of evidence. Also, a number of articles on appeals investigate factors other than control of adjudicator behavior. Shavell (1995) and Cameron and Kornhauser (2004) study how the appeals process functions to correct lower court errors (as opposed to preventing them, the subject of this article); Spitzer and Talley (2000) , and Daughety and Reinganum (2004) analyze the exercise of discretion by appeals courts over whether to review lower court decisions; and Daughety and Reinganum (2000) stress inference by appeals courts about superior courts from the fact that appeals are brought.
Basic Model
The basic model is described by the following simple timeline. As the timeline also indicates, a litigant is presumed to be able to make an appeal to an appeals court at a cost; an appeal is assumed to involve a cost to defend on the part of the opposing litigant as well.
If an appeal is made, the appeals court is assumed to set the adjudicator's decision equal to the socially optimal one d S * if the decision deviated from d S *. In other words, the appeals court is implicitly assumed to have social welfare w(d) as its utility function,
The decision d might be interpreted as the amount that one litigant is required to pay the other (possibly zero if no liability is found). 7 The assumption of strict concavity guarantees that there is a unique optimal decision and that the closer a decision is to the optimal one, the better. The importance of the assumption is noted at the end of this section. 8 The results to be obtained would be qualitatively similar if instead it were assumed that litigant 1 has a utility function v 1 (d) that is monotonically increasing in d and that litigant 2 has a utility function v 2 (d) that is monotonically decreasing in d. 9 The case in which the appeals court has a different utility function from society's is discussed at the end of this section, in sections 4.4 and 4.5, and in the first concluding remark. We may summarize as follows. (c) The adjudicator's decision d** differs from the socially optimal decision d S *.// It should be noted that, the smaller the set N, the closer will be the induced decision d** of the adjudicator to d S *; hence, the lower is the cost c of an appeal, the closer must be the adjudicator's decision to d S *. Also, as explained in the proof, the penalty r for reversal plays no role in adjudicator behavior; regardless of the magnitude of r (even if it is zero), the adjudicator will choose a decision in N, so that r is irrelevant for him.
The next proposition states that the appeals process can only enhance social welfare. 
Appeals Process versus Random Monitoring
To gain understanding about the appeals process, it is useful to compare it to random monitoring of adjudicators' decisions, under which a sanction would be imposed on the adjudicator if his decision deviated from the socially optimal decision. Suppose that p = probability that the adjudicator's decision d is monitored;
The amount m must be expended in order for the decision of the adjudicator to be observed by the social authority. Hence, the expected cost of monitoring is pm.
If the adjudicator decides not to choose d S * he will choose d*. Hence, he will be
If pk is not large enough to satisfy (2), so that monitoring has no effect on adjudicator behavior, then monitoring is inferior to the appeals process. In particular, under monitoring, social welfare is w(d*) -pm, whereas under the appeals process social welfare is at least w(d*); monitoring is worse since it absorbs resources, whereas the appeals process is costless as appeals are never made.
If pk is large enough so that (2) 
that is, if the loss due to the deviation from optimal decisions under the appeals process is less than the expected monitoring expense.
The following proposition states the conclusions that we have reached about monitoring.
Proposition 3. Monitoring of adjudicators' decisions results in socially desirable
decisions if the probability of monitoring is sufficiently high. When monitoring does induce socially desirable decisions, it may or may not be superior to the appeals process (which does not induce socially optimal decisions).// It should be remarked that the cost advantage of the appeals process over monitoring, namely, that under monitoring a positive expected cost must be incurred, derives from the fact that, as stated in the introduction, the appeals process uses the information that the litigants naturally possess about decisions. This means that, under the appeals process, there can be a threat of review that is conditioned on whether the decision deviates from the socially desirable one. Under monitoring, in contrast, the threat of review cannot be conditioned on the decision since the decision is not observed; hence, to affect adjudicator behavior monitoring must occur regardless of adjudicators'
decisions. In effect, the appeals process involves monitoring from below by an informed party, rather than monitoring from above by an uninformed party.
Extensions of the Basic Model
Let us now consider (separately) a number of extensions of the basic model of the appeals process.
Subsidy of appeals. Suppose that appeals are subsidized by an amount s,
where s # c, so that the private cost to a litigant of an appeal is c -s. Proposition 1 then applies, with c -s playing the role of c. Hence, the set of decisions that do not result in appeals becomes
If the appeals process without subsidy results in a change in the adjudicator's decision, then the greater the subsidy of the appeals process, the greater the change in the adjudicator's decision and the greater the increase in social welfare. This is so since, by On the inability of the prosecution to make an appeal in a criminal proceeding (except in respect to certain issues regarding sentencing), see Stith (1990) .
Settlement of appeals.
It was assumed in the basic model that a litigant would make an appeal if doing so would be worth his while. However, whenever a litigant would wish to make an appeal, it would be mutually beneficial for him and the opposing litigant to settle, in order to save the litigation costs associated with an appeal.
To elaborate, suppose that both of the litigants know each other's litigation costs, so know whether either would have a credible threat to make an appeal. Given this assumption of symmetric information, it will be presumed that the litigants would make a Proposition 6. If litigants are able to settle appeals, adjudicators will be led to behave exactly as described in Proposition 1. In particular, adjudicators will choose decisions that forestall appeals -and thus that forestall settlements as well.// A comment should also be made about the possibility of settlement of the case before it is ever adjudicated (as distinct from after it is adjudicated, in lieu of an appeal).
Since such a settlement would reflect the adjudicator's decision, and since this would be d**, the effect of the threat of appeal on adjudicator behavior would influence settlements in the first place. forestall appeals, the n -j +1 st level decision d n -j + 1 ** would be the final decision (since that court would choose a decision that would forestall appeals). Consequently,
Multiple
It follows from (5) Additionally, we claim that
where the inclusion is generally strict. In particular, (6) implies that We have now established Proposition 7. Suppose that there are n levels of appeal, where the highest level court has society's preferences.
(a) The initial adjudicator's decision d 0 ** is the personally best decision in the set N(1) that forestalls appeals at the first level of appeals, so that appeals never in fact occur. To examine this point, assume that there is a probability distribution of d S * and that litigants and adjudicators know this distribution but not d S * in a particular case.
Since the expected return for litigant 1 from an appeal would be E(d S *), he would make an appeal when E(d S *) -c > d, and litigant 2 would make an appeal when E(d S *) + c < d, so that appeals would not be made when the decision d is in N = [E(d S *) -c, E(d S *) + c].
As in the basic model, the adjudicator will select the best decision in N, so that appeals will not occur, but the logic behind this conclusion is slightly different from in Regarding social welfare, clearly, if the appeals process changes adjudicator behavior, it may or may not raise social welfare in a particular case, since the threat of appeal could result in a decision that is farther away from the socially desirable outcome than the unconstrained choice d* of the adjudicator would be. It is also true that the appeals process might not raise social welfare in an expected sense; see the Appendix for an example. Hence, it cannot be said that the appeals process is socially desirable in the presence of uncertainty about the appeals court decisions. The problem is that adjudicator behavior is influenced not by the true decision that the appeals court would make but by an imperfect perception of it. The conclusions are summarized in the following result.
Proposition 8. Assume that litigants and the adjudicator know only the probability distribution over the socially optimal outcome d S * that would be reached by the appeals court.
(a) The adjudicator's decision d** is the personally best decision in the set N that forestalls appeals, so that appeals never in fact occur. 
the derivative with respect to d of which is
Note that the first term is the marginal benefit to the adjudicator from raising d: the Note that the point that there is always some effect of the appeals process on decisions is different from in the basic model, where if d* is in N, the appeals process has no influence on adjudicator behavior. Here there is no N known to the adjudicator, there is always a threat of appeal, so always a reason for him to alter the decision somewhat. 22 At d < d*, the probability of appeal is higher than at d*.
Because the adjudicator chooses d** different from d S *, there will be a positive probability of appeals, and costs borne in the process, which is another difference from the basic model. The expected costs of appeals are given by
since F(|d S * -d**|) is the likelihood of appeal and E(c|c < |d S * -d**|) are the mean costs of the litigant who brings an appeal.
Observe also that the higher is the penalty r for reversal, the closer will be the adjudicator's decision to d S *. 23 This also contrasts with the basic model, where r did not influence the decision; since appeals actually occur and result in reversals, the penalty for them must matter to adjudicator behavior. Also, raising r increases social welfare for two Because the appeals process results in the occurrence of costly appeals, the question arises whether the appeals process might be socially undesirable (it is obvious that it may be desirable, if the cost of appeals is sufficiently low). The answer is that the appeals process may be undesirable, the reason being, in essence, that the decision of a litigant whether or not to bring an appeal involves a comparison of the private cost of an 23 The first order condition determining d is, from (10), If z(d(r) , r) = 0 is differentiated with respect to r, we obtain that dN (r) = -z r /z d , but z d < 0 (the second-order condition for a maximum), and z r is f(d S * -d) > 0, so that dN (r) > 0. Note too that if the reversal penalty r were not a constant but an increasing function of the deviation |d S * -d|, there would be an additional incentive for the adjudicator to choose a decision closer to d S *. appeal versus the private benefit, whereas the social comparison is different.
demonstrate that the appeals process might be socially undesirable, observe that the behavior of litigants and adjudicators is determined by (8) and the probability distribution f over c. This implies, among other things, that (8) (c) The appeals process may or may not be socially desirable (because its benefit in altering adjudicator decisions may or may not outweigh its expected costs).// 4.7 Discretion of appeals courts whether to hear appeals. To this point, it has been assumed that appeals courts consider any case that is appealed to them, whereas in fact appeals courts sometimes have discretion whether or not to hear an appeal. 25 Here discretion is investigated using the assumptions of the last section, where appeals are sometimes brought. The possible value of discretion in this context is, as mentioned in the introduction, that the appeals court can refuse to hear cases for which the social benefit is outweighed by the cost. This can help to counter the problem noted in the last section that, due to the cost of the appeals process, the appeals process might not be socially desirable.
To be specific, assume that the appeals court can costlessly decide not to review a case that has been appealed, and that if the case is not heard, no costs will be borne by the litigants. 26 The appeals court will reject a case if and only if
For given that an appeal has been brought, social welfare will fall if the appeal is heard when (12) 
To the degree that (12) prevents appeals from being brought, discretion must raise social welfare given the decision of the adjudicator. However, because discretion may reduce the probability of appeal, it may lower the incentive of adjudicators to conform their decisions to d S * and so may indirectly reduce social welfare. This raises the question whether discretion could be socially undesirable. Examples (see the Appendix)
show that discretion may lower social welfare as well as raise it. (Note that it is not paradoxical that discretion might lower social welfare, for the appeals court decides whether to hear appeals on the basis of (12), which is to say, it maximizes social welfare only in an ex post sense.) The main conclusion about discretion is Proposition 11. Under the assumptions of Proposition 10, suppose that the appeals court has discretion to decide whether or not to hear an appeal. Then given any decision of the adjudicator, appeals court discretion can only lead to an increase in social welfare. But because the adjudicator's decision generally changes due to appeals court end of section 2) that the appeals court maximizes social welfare in an ex post sense; the appeals court is assumed not to be able to commit to a policy of rejecting appeals.
28 Not only is this possibility formally apparent, since no restrictions have been imposed on w other than that it is strictly concave, there are economic explanations for the possibility. An important one is that social welfare may depend on damages d because of the incentives that payment of damages would create to prevent harm. These incentives might be weak (for example, there might be little that can be done to prevent harm), implying that w would not be very sensitive to d. In such a case, the effect of d on w might be less than the change in d, which is what the litigants care about. discretion, social welfare may or may not increase as a consequence of appeals court discretion.//
Concluding Remarks
(a) The main point elaborated in this article -that the threat of appeal leads adjudicators to make decisions that conform more closely to the socially optimal decision than would otherwise be the case -rests on the assumption that the appeals court would tend to right incorrect decisions, in other words, that the appeals court embodies the social interest. Yet this is a fiction in a strict sense, since appeals courts must in fact be comprised of individuals who, like the lower court adjudicators of the model studied here, may have their own preferences. Hence, the problem of policing adjudicator behavior is recapitulated at the appeals court level. (Indeed, if the appeals court judge has the same preferences as the trial court judge, the appeals process is valueless.
29 )
This problem of who guards the guardians is ameliorated in a number of ways going outside the analysis of this article. In particular, society may invest special effort in selecting appeals court judges to ensure that their preferences are aligned with society's, it may have appeals court judges decide in panels (so as to offset each others' differences in preferences), and it may induce appeals court judges to write opinions explaining their decisions (reducing their ability to contravene social preferences). The problem that appeals court judges have their own preferences is also reduced in two ways studied in the analysis. First, as noted in Corollary 9, if appeals court judges' preferences are socially desirable on average and trial court judges do not know which appeals court judge they will draw in a case, then the appeals process will function well. Second, as shown in section 4.4, if there are tiers of appeals with the adjudicator at the topmost level having the social interest, the social decisional preferences will be transmitted (to a degree reflecting appeals costs at all levels, among other factors) down to the level of the trial court; thus by appropriate selection of adjudicators only at the highest levels of appeal, society has at its disposal a relatively cheap way of helping to ensure that decisionmaking at the level of trial courts is guided by its preferences.
(b) At the outset of this article, it was suggested that the appeals process might be viewed in a general light, as a means of reducing an agent's deviation from optimal behavior in a principal and agent setting. To amplify, the reason that an agent's behavior differs from what would be mutually best for him and the principal involves, of course, the principal's lack of information, either about the agent's information set or about his action. 30 Implicit in the assumption that the principal lacks information is that the cost of obtaining the information about the agent is too high to make that worthwhile. In some circumstances, however, an analogue to the appeals process could operate to cheaply reduce the agency problem. This might be so when three conditions hold: there is a person who is in a natural position to know the agent's information set or to observe his action; this third person could credibly report his observation to the principal; and the third person would have a motive to do so, notably if he would suffer from the agent's deviations. 31 The threat of such a third person making a report to the principal could 30 See, for example, the articles collected in Pratt and Zeckhauser (1991) . 31 For example, an employee (the third person) working under a manager (the agent) might observe the manager shirking (for instance, showing up late), might be able to convey this information credibly to a higher level party in the firm (representing the principal), and might suffer due to the shirking (have to work harder while the manager is absent). However, it is evident that one of the three conditions often would not hold. Relevant information about the agent might not be known by a third person (for make the agent behave better, and to the degree that the agent acted so as to forestall a report, this appeals-like process would not involve cost. Explicit investigation of when these conditions might hold (or could be engendered) in a principal and agent framework might be worthwhile. 32 instance, there might be no one who is privy to the manager's information set, such as his menu of business opportunities); or if relevant information is known by a third person, it might not be easy to credibly convey (it might be difficult to establish that the manager often showed up late, or what the manager's business opportunities were); or the third person might not have a motive to make a report (a manager might find a way to punish the third person for having made a report). 32 Among the issues of interest in such an investigation is that of possible collusion between the agent and a third person for him not to make a report to the principal (but how would an agreement between them be enforced?). An article that deals with these issues in the specific context of the government procurement process is Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1994) , in which procurement officers are viewed as agents of the government, the principal, and firms that do not obtain contracts may protest to a government board of contract appeals.
, so that the socially preferred decision of the appeals court is 10. Let r = 0 and let there be two possible costs of making and defending an appeal: c 1 = 1, with probability .1; c 2 = 2, with probability .9.
No appeals court discretion: The adjudicator will obviously not want to choose d Appeals courts have discretion: In this case, any appeal would be rejected, since the maximum possible social value of an appeal is .001(10 -2) 2 = .064 and the minimum cost is 2. Since there can be no threat of appeal, the adjudicator will choose d = 2, there will be no appeals, and social welfare will be -.001(10 -2) 2 = -.064.
Effect of discretion: Giving appeals courts discretion raises social welfare, from -.2036 to -.064. The reason is that it results in the rejection of appeals whose social costs outweigh social benefits. The resulting saving in social costs of appeals outweighs the undesirable effect that discretion has on the adjudicator incentives, which here is to reduce the decision d from 8 to 2.
Example where discretion lowers social welfare. Let the adjudicator's utility again be -(d -2) 2 , so that his unconstrained preferred decision d* is 2, and let social welfare be -(d -10) 2 /3, so that the socially preferred decision of the appeals court is 10.
Let r = 0 and let there be three possible costs of making and defending an appeal: c 1 = 1, with probability .1; c 2 = 2, with probability .5; and c 3 = 3 with probability .4.
No appeals court discretion: The adjudicator will not want to choose d > 10, so Appeals courts have discretion: In this case, again, the adjudicator will not choose d > 10, and will, by essentially the argument given above, not choose d in (7,8), (8, 9), or (9, 10] . If the adjudicator chooses d = 9, as before, no one would appeal, so the issue of discretion is moot, and the adjudicator's utility would be -49. If the adjudicator chooses d = 8, whereas before c 1 s would appeal, these appeals would be rejected by the appeals court, since the social value of such an appeal would be (10 -8) 2 /3 = 4/3, whereas the social cost of the appeal (for both parties) is 2. Hence, the utility of the adjudicator would simply be -(8 -2) 2 = -36. If the adjudicator chooses d = 7, the c 1 s would wish to appeal and their appeal would be accepted, since its social value would be -(10 -7) 2 /3 = 3, whereas its social cost is 2. However, although the c 2 s would also want to make an appeal, their appeal would be rejected, since its social cost is 4 > 3. Hence, the adjudicator's expected utility would be -[.1(10 -2) 2 + .9(7 -2) 2 ] = -28. 
